CASE STUDY OF THE MERGER BETWEEN
BANK OF AMERICA AND MERRILL LYNCH
Robert J. Rhee†

The financial crisis of 2008 has posed innumerable problems in law, policy,
and economics. A key event in the history of the financial crisis was Bank of
America‟s acquisition of Merrill Lynch. Along with the fire sale of Bear Stearns
and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the rescue of Merrill Lynch confirmed the
worst fears about the financial crisis. Before this acquisition, Bank of America had
long desired a top tier investment banking business, and Merrill Lynch represented
a strategic opportunity to acquire a troubled but premier franchise of significant
scale.1 As the financial markets continued to unravel after execution of the merger
agreement, this golden opportunity turned into a highly risky gamble. Merrill
Lynch was losing money at an astonishing rate, an event sufficient for Bank of
America to consider seriously invoking the merger agreement‟s material adverse
change clause. 2 The deal ultimately closed, but only after the government
threatened to fire Bank of America‟s management and board if the company
attempted to terminate the deal. The government took this coercive action to save
the financial system from complete collapse. The harm to the financial system
from a broken deal, officials feared, would have been unthinkable. The board‟s
motivation is less clear. Like many classic corporate law cases, the factors
influencing the board and management were complex. This case study examines
these complexities, which raise important, unresolved issues in corporate
governance and management.
In 2008, three major investment banks—Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers,
and Merrill Lynch—collapsed or were acquired under distress, and these events
played a large part in triggering the global financial crisis.3 In March, Bear Stearns
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1
Bank of America formed from the acquisition of BankAmerica by NationsBank in 1998. NationsBank was an
aggressive, acquisitive bank under the leadership of Hugh McColl, whom Ken Lewis would ultimately succeed as
chief executive officer (“CEO”). Before the acquisition of BankAmerica, NationsBank had sought an investment
banking franchise, and following this strategy acquired in 1997 Montgomery Securities, a midsized San Franciscobased investment bank. Peter Truell, Nationsbank Confirms a $1.2 Billion Deal for Montgomery, N.Y. TIMES, July
1, 1997, at D5. The acquisition of Merrill Lynch is a continuation of Bank of America‟s ambition in investment
banking.
2
See infra Part I (describing the events surrounding the acquisition of Merrill Lynch and the testimonies of key
principals).
3
See generally Robert J. Rhee, The Decline of Investment Banking: Preliminary Thoughts on the Evolution of the
Industry 19962008, 5 J. BUS. L. & TECH. (forthcoming 2010) (discussing the collapse of the investment banking
sector). At the time, there were only five full service, independent investment banks left after the industry
consolidation of the 1990s and the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act. Id. The banks were Goldman Sachs, Morgan
Stanley, Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns. Id.
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had already agreed to be sold in a fire sale to JPMorgan Chase.4 This sale was a
harbinger of the worst to come. By late summer, many of the largest, most
important domestic and foreign financial institutions faced extraordinary peril,
including Citigroup and American International Group (“AIG”), two of the largest
American financial institutions at the time.5 On September 15, Lehman Brothers
announced its bankruptcy, and Bank of America (“the Bank”) and Merrill Lynch
(“Merrill”) announced their merger.6 If the fall of Bear Stearns was the first major
tremor in the financial markets, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers triggered a
seismic change from market disturbance to market failure. The pending merger
between the Bank and Merrill subsequently got caught in this tectonic shift. Like
everything else affected by the market meltdown, the merger‟s fate faced great
uncertainty and the events leading to the ultimate closing of this landmark deal
constitute a major episode of the history of Wall Street and the financial crisis of
2008.
A.

Acquisition in Crisis

The merger proxy recounts the extraordinary circumstances under which
this acquisition was struck. 7 On Saturday, September 13, Ken Lewis and John
Thain, the CEOs of the Bank and Merrill, respectively, met to discuss a strategic
relationship. 8 Thain proposed a 9.9 percent minority investment in Merrill, but
Lewis wanted a whole acquisition.9 Lewis quickly got his way, and they agreed on
an acquisition. Due diligence commenced that day and continued well into Sunday
night.10 During these frantic two days, the two parties negotiated the terms of the
merger.11 The deal was structured as a stock exchange with Merrill shareholders
getting 0.8595 shares of the Bank‟s stock for each share of Merrill stock.12 This
constituted a hefty 70 percent premium over the previous Friday‟s closing share
4

The purchase price was about $10 per share. See Kahan & Rock, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at
716-21 (describing the circumstances surrounding the deal). A year before, Bear Stearns shares traded at $170 per
share. Andrew Ross Sorkin & Landon Thomas, Jr., JPMorgan Acts to Buy Ailing Bear Stearns at Huge Discount,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2008, at A1.
5
See Joe Nocera, 36 Hours of Alarm and Action as Crisis Spiraled, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, at A1 (describing
the crisis and the troubles of financial institutions).
6
Andrew Ross Sorkin, Bids to Halt Financial Crisis Reshape Landscape of Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2008,
at A1.
7
BANK OF AM. CORP. & MERRILL LYNCH & CO., MERGER PROXY 49-51 (Nov. 3, 2008) [hereinafter “MERGER
PROXY”].
8
Id. at 49. Lewis has been the Bank‟s chief executive officer since 2001. During the period analyzed here, mainly
from September 2008 to January 2009, he was also the chairman of the board. On April 29, 2009, he was replaced
by Walter Massey as chairman, though he remained a board member. Press Release, Bank of Am., Bank of
America Announces Results of Annual Meeting (Apr. 29, 2009). Thain was appointed chief executive officer of
Merrill in December 2007. He resigned from Merrill shortly after the merger closed in January 2009. Julie
Creswell & Louise Story, Merrill Lynch's leader gets the ax, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Jan 23, 2009, at A1.
Subsequently, Lewis also announced his early resignation. See WILLIAM D. COHAN, HOUSE OF CARDS: A TALE OF
HUBRIS AND WRETCHED EXCESS ON WALL STREET 109 (2009).
9
MERGER PROXY, supra note 15, at 49.
10
Id. at 49-50.
11
Id. at 50.
12
Id. at 5.
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prices of the two companies,13 and valued Merrill at a multiple of 1.8x tangible
book value.14 In late Sunday afternoon, the financial advisers informed the Bank‟s
board about the results of the due diligence and provided their fairness opinions.15
The boards of the two banks unanimously approved the merger. 16 The merger
agreement was signed on early Monday morning.17
The loss of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill—three of only five
full-service, independent investment banks remaining on Wall Street at the time—
in rapid succession was inconceivable only a few months before.18 By the time the
Merrill acquisition was announced on Monday, September 15, the stock market
crash was well underway. The S&P 500 index was down 24 percent from its
October 2007 historic highs. 19 A few weeks later, in October 2008, the equity
market fell off the cliff and the S&P 500 index was down 43 percent from the year
before.20 The stock market crash reflected broader economic problems such as the
crash of the housing market, severe disturbances in the credit markets, illiquidity
contagion among financial institutions, global recession, and increasing
unemployment.21 The most troubling and dangerous of these factors was a liquidity
crisis in the credit markets, including commercial paper, repo, and money markets
that fund operating cash flow for many businesses.22 Investment banks were not
immune, and indeed they were especially vulnerable to a disturbance in the credit
market because of their highly leveraged balance sheets. 23 An inability to fund
working capital had the potential to wreck havoc by impairing the flow of credit
even in healthy, nonfinancial sectors of the economy.24 According to Ben Bernanke,
a prominent scholar of the Great Depression and current Chairman of the Federal
Reserve, “the financial shocks that hit the global economy in September and
October were the worst since the 1930s, and they helped push the global economy
Id. at 53. On September 12, 2008, the Bank‟s stock price closed at $33.74 and Merrill‟s stock closed at $17.05,
implying a deal value of $29 per share of Merrill stock. Id. at Letter to Shareholders. Subsequently, on October 30,
the Bank stock closed at $22.78 and Merrill‟s stock, which by this time was closely pegged to the Bank‟s stock
price, was $17.78. Id. at 8.
14
Bank of America Buys Merrill Lynch, Creating Unique Financial Services Firm, Bank of America Press Release
(Sept. 15, 2008), available at http://www.ml.com/?id=7695_7696_8149_88278_106886_108117.
15
Merger Proxy, supra note 15, at 51.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
See generally Rhee, supra note 11 (discussing the demise of Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch,
and generally the problems independent investment banks confronted during the financial crisis).
19
On October 9, 2007, the S&P 500 closed at 1565.15. On September 15, 2008, it closed at 1192.7. Index price
information is available on http://finance.yahoo.com.
20
On October 10, 2008, the S&P 500 closed at 899.22. On March 9, 2009, the index closed at 676.53, down 57
percent from the historic high on October 9, 2007. Index price information is available on
http://finance.yahoo.com.
21
See generally MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK: GLOBAL PANIC AND GOVERNMENT BAILOUTS—HOW WE GOT
HERE AND WHAT MUST BE DONE TO FIX IT (FT Press 2009).
22
Conrad de Aenlle, It Couldn‟t Get Worse, But It Did, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2008 at BU19 (noting that credit
markets were seizing up and investors were withdrawing money from the commercial paper market). See also
Carter Dougherty & Katrin Bennhold, Credit Squeeze Takes Hold in Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2008, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/11/business/worldbusiness/11crunch.html.
23
Rhee, supra note 11.
24
Id.
13
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into the deepest recession since World War II.” 25 This crisis prompted the federal
government to take unprecedented intervention in the market.
On October 3, 2008, President George W. Bush signed the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 into law.26 This centerpiece legislation of the
financial crisis authorized the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”), a $700
billion fund available to the U.S. Treasury Department (“the Treasury”) to buy
troubled assets from financial institutions.27 Shortly thereafter, the Treasury used
TARP to inject $125 billion in capital in the form of preferred shares and warrants
into nine leading financial institutions, including the Bank and Merrill. 28 With
respect to the Bank, the federal government purchased 600,000 shares of
nonvoting preferred stock and warrants to purchase over 73 million shares of
common stock. 29 However, the government did not acquire substantial voting
control over the Bank.30
On November 3, 2008, the Bank issued the merger proxy with information
dated as of October 30.31 The proxy identified as a risk factor the possibility that
changing market conditions may ultimately affect the deal economics. 32 Among
other things, it warned that changes in the operations and prospects, general market
and economic conditions “may significantly alter the value of Bank of America or
Merrill Lynch or the prices of shares of Bank of America common stock or Merrill
Lynch common stock by the time the merger is completed.”33
25

Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress Before the H. Comm. Financial Servs., 111th Congr. (July
21, 2009) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Board of Governors for the Fed. Reserve System)
[hereinafter “Bernanke Testimony of July 21, 2009”]. Bernanke was a professor of economics at Princeton
University before his appointment as chairman of the Federal Reserve. He testified that without the massive
government intervention the economy would probably have collapsed. He provided this chilling assessment:
I think you would‟ve had a very good chance of a collapse of the credit system. Even what we did see,
with perhaps the failure of Lehman was for example, commercial paper rates shot up and availability
declined. Many other markets were severely disrupted, including corporate bond markets. So even with
the rescue and even with the stabilization that we achieved in October, there was a severe increase in
stress in the financial markets. My belief is that if we had not had the money to address the global
banking crisis in October we might very well have had a collapse of the global banking system that
would‟ve created a huge problem in financial markets, and in the broad economy that might‟ve lasted
many years.
Id.
26
12 U.S.C. §§ 5201 et seq. (2008).
27
Id. § 5225.
28
On October 28, 2008, these capital injections were made: Bank of America ($15 billion), Bank of New York
Mellon ($3 billion), Citigroup ($25 billion), Goldman Sachs ($10 billion), JPMorgan Chase ($25 billion), Morgan
Stanley ($10 billion), State Street ($2 billion), Wells Fargo ($25 billion), Merrill Lynch ($10 billion). Troubled
Asset
Relief
Program
Transaction
Report
(Nov.
17,
2008),
available
at
http://www.financialstability.gov/latest/reportsanddocs.html. Preferred stock is equity capital that has priority over
common stock, and is usually characterized by a priority on dividends and assets upon liquidation relative to
common stock. BLACK‟S LAW DICTIONARY 1553 (9th ed. 2009). Warrants are stock options issued by the
company. Id. at 1555.
29
Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K) Item 1.01 & A-7 (Oct. 31, 2008).
30
The 73 million shares would constitute a small percentage of shares. See Bank of Am. Corp., Annual Report
(Form 10-K), at 2 (over 5 billion shares of common stock issued and outstanding as of December 31, 2008).
31
MERGER PROXY, supra note 15.
32
Id. at 23-26.
33
Id. at 24.
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On November 5, 2008, Merrill reported in its third quarter 10-Q an $8.25
billion pretax loss from continuing operations. 34 The 10-Q disclosed difficult
market conditions that could adversely affect financial results.35 A day later, the
Bank also issued its 10-Q, which provided similar warnings, including “Merrill
Lynch‟s ability to mitigate its risk by selling or hedging its exposures is also
limited by the market environment, and its future results may continue to be
materially impacted by the valuation adjustments applied to these positions.” 36
These disclosures simply stated the obvious. The common experience of all
investors in the equity markets, including shareholders of both Merrill and the
Bank, would have suggested that the financial markets were highly volatile.
In late November 2008, the Federal Reserve approved the merger under
the Bank Holding Act,37 and on December 5, the shareholders of the Bank and
Merrill voted in favor of the deal. 38 Thereafter, in early December while the
acquisition was still pending, Lewis learned that Merrill was accruing enormous
losses from its investments in toxic assets.39 On December 14, he advised the board
of this development.40 This unexpected news gave the Bank serious pause about
closing the acquisition. Lewis considered exercising the merger agreement‟s
material adverse change clause (“MAC”), which if legally exercised would have
allowed the company to terminate the deal based on a material change in events
after the signing of the merger agreement but before closing.41
On December 17, Lewis told Henry Paulson, then Treasury Secretary, and
Bernanke that the Bank was considering invoking the MAC.42 Lewis told them that
the estimated losses at Merrill were $12 billion for the fourth quarter of 2008, a

34

Merrill Lynch & Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 4 (Nov. 5, 2008).
Merrill cautioned that “[t]he challenging conditions that existed in the global financial markets during the first
half of the year continued during the third quarter of 2008”; that this “adverse market environment [had]
intensified towards the end of the quarter, particularly in September, and was characterized by increased illiquidity
in the credit markets, wider credit spreads . . . and concerns about corporate earnings and the solvency of many
financial institutions”; that “[t]urbulent market conditions in the short and medium-term will continue to have an
adverse impact on our core businesses”; and that “our businesses must contend with extreme volatility and
continued deleveraging in the market.” Id. at 82-83.
36
Bank of America Co., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), at 175-77 (Nov. 6, 2008). The 10-Q also disclosed: that
“difficult market conditions have adversely affected our industry”; that there has been “significant write-downs of
asset values by financial institutions”; and that “lack of confidence in the financial markets has adversely affected
our business, financial condition and results of operations.” Id.
37
Bank Of America And Merrill Lynch: How Did A Private Deal Turn Into A Federal Bailout? Part II, Before the
H. Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Congr. (June 25, 2009) (statement of Ben S. Bernanke,
Chairman, Board of Governors for the Fed. Reserve System).
38
Id.
39
In re Executive Compensation Investigation: Bank of America-Merrill Lynch Before the Attorney General of the
State of New York 11-12 (Feb. 26, 2009) (examination of Kenneth Lee Lewis, Chief Executive Officer, Bank of
America)
(identifying
the
period
as
December
5
through
14),
available
at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/apr/pdfs/Exhibit%20A%20to%204.23.09%20letter.pdf [hereinafter
“Lewis Testimony Before the New York Attorney General”].
40
Id. at 13.
41
Id. at 37.
42
Bernanke was appointed to a four-year term as the chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
on February 1, 2006. Paulson was the Treasury Secretary from July 2006 to January 2009 under the Bush
Administration. Before this, he was the CEO of Goldman Sachs.
35
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staggering $3 billion increase from previous estimate of just six days before. 43
These losses were stunning. 44 Paulson and Bernanke strongly advised Lewis
against terminating the Merrill deal because they believed that this would lead to
adverse consequences, including the insolvency of Merrill, litigation against the
Bank, and the injection of more systemic risk and uncertainty into the capital
market.45 The Federal Reserve believed that if the deal fell through, Merrill could
not have survived as an independent firm and would have collapsed like Bear
Stearns and Lehman Brothers. 46 It feared that Merrill‟s collapse would have
continued a domino effect to other systemically-important financial institutions.47
On December 21, Lewis talked to Paulson again about exercising the
MAC. During this crucial conversation, Paulson threatened to fire the Bank‟s
board and management if the company sought to terminate or renegotiate the
merger.48 Such termination or renegotiation of the deal would have jeopardized the
merger or delayed its closing.49 Lewis took this message back to the board.50
On December 22, the board met to discuss whether it was still in favor of
proceeding with the Merrill acquisition.51 The board minutes show that Lewis in
his CEO capacity reported to the board these key points of the call with Paulson:
(i) first and foremost, the Treasury and Fed are unified in their view that the failure of the
Corporation to complete the acquisition of Merrill Lynch would result in systemic risk to the
financial services system in America and would have adverse consequences for the
Corporation;
(ii) second, the Treasury and Fed stated strongly that were the Corporation to invoke the
material adverse change (“MAC”) clause in the merger agreement with Merrill Lynch and fail
to close the transaction, the Treasury and Fed would remove the Board and management of the
Corporation;
(iii) third, the Treasury and Fed have confirmed that they will provide assistance to the
Corporation to restore capital and to protect the Corporation against adverse impact of certain
Merrill Lynch assets; and
(iv) fourth, the Fed and Treasury stated that the investment and asset protection promised could
not be provided or completed by scheduled closing date of the merger, January 1, 2009; that
the merger should close on schedule, and that the Corporation can rely on the Fed and Treasury

43

Lewis Testimony Before the New York Attorney General, supra note 47, at 40.
In an e-mail, Paulson described the losses as “breath-taking.” Michael R. Crittenden, Fed Emails Bash BofA
Chief in Tussle over Merrill Deal, WALL ST. J., June 11, 2009, at A1. Another internal e-mail from a senior vice
president at the Federal Reserve reads, “Merrill is really scary and ugly.” Paul Tharp, Lewis Ticks „Em Off: Jittery
BofA Head Keeps Silence Before Congress, N.Y. POST, June 12, 2009, at 31.
45
See infra Part I.B. (discussing the roles of both Paulson and Bernanke).
46
Merrill‟s deterioration was significant, and “all but ensure[d] that the firm could not survive as a stand-alone
entity without raising substantial new capital (and/or government support) that is unlikely to be available given the
uncertainty about its prospects,” Phil Mattingly, Did Bank of America Get Stong-Armed in Merrill Deal?, C.Q.
TODAY , June 10, 2009, available at http://www.cqpolitics.com/wmspage.cfm?docID=news-000003140207.
47
Id.
48
Lewis Testimony Before the New York Attorney General, supra note 39, at 52.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 53.
44
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to complete and deliver the promised support by January 20, 2009, the date scheduled for the
release of earnings by the Corporation.52

At the board meeting, Lewis communicated the management‟s
recommendation not to invoke the MAC.53 This recommendation was based on,
among other things, “instruction from the Fed and Treasury not to exercise the
MAC” and the government‟s verbal assurance of financial assistance through
TARP to support the Bank and provide some downside protection against
declining asset values. 54 One board member, called to testify before Congress,
recalled the following from the board meeting:
[Lewis] expressed the fact that the government thought it would be a major mistake for us to
walk away. They thought it would be very dangerous systemically and very dangerous and not
positive at all for the Bank of America. . . . He expressed the sentiment and there was another
session later in the month, that the government would provide financing. There was nothing in
writing, but it was from very senior officials of the government that one would believe would
follow through. The details were not reviewed with the board. . . . The issue was relatively
clear to me. In a perfect world, it would have been better to walk away.55

With respect to the board‟s inability or disinclination to “walk away” from Merrill,
this board member “express[ed] remorse for all shareholders” who took the
financial loss.56
Based on the considerations presented to the board, it decided not to
invoke the MAC, renegotiate the merger price with Merrill, or inform shareholders
of Merrill‟s losses ahead of planned disclosure.57 The minutes purport to document
the basis for this decision:
Discussion ensued, with the Board clarifying that [it] was not persuaded or influenced by the
statement by the federal regulators that the Board and management would be removed by the
federal regulators if the Corporation were to exercise the MAC clause and fail to complete the
acquisition of Merrill Lynch. The Board concurred it would reach a decision that it deemed in
the best interest of the Corporation and its shareholders without regard to this representation by
the federal regulators.58

52

Minutes of Special Meeting of Board of Directors of Bank of America Corporation, at 2 (Dec. 22, 2008)
(emphasis
added)
[hereinafter
“Board
Minutes
of
Dec.
22,
2008”],
available
at
http://www.oag.state.ny.us/media_center/2009/apr/pdfs/Exhibit%20B%20to%204.23.09%20letter.pdf.
53
Id. at 2-3.
54
Id.
55
Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did A Private Deal Turn Into A Federal Bailout? Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. 16-17 (Nov. 17, 2009) (statements of Brian Moynihan,
President of Consumer and Small Business Banking, Bank of Am., Charles Gifford, Member, Bank of Am. Bd. of
Dirs., Thomas May, Member, Bank of Am. Bd. of Dirs., and Timothy Mayopolous, Former General Counsel,
Bank of Am.) (emphasis added) [hereinafter “Gifford et al. Testimony”]
56
Id. at 15. This testimony sought to explain an email in which the board member wrote, “Unfortunately, it‟s [sic]
also screw[s] the shareholders.” Id. While the language in this private email is crude, it provides an unvarnished
assessment of the effect on shareholders.
57
Board Minutes of Dec. 22, 2008, supra note 60, at 2-3. The minutes provide: “Mr. Lewis stated the purpose of
the special meeting is to insure that the Board is in accord with management‟s recommendation to complete the
acquisition of Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. („Merrill Lynch‟), as scheduled on January 1, 2009, pursuant to the
[merger agreement] . . . after due consideration of the undertakings and admonishments of the federal regulators.”
Id. at 1.
58
Id. at 3.
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While self-consciously professing its independence, the board made a considered
decision (the deliberate decision not to invoke a MAC), and thereby decided to
close the Merrill merger as planned.59
On January 1, 2009, ten days after the Bank‟s board meeting, the
acquisition of Merrill closed.60 Other than the original merger proxy, there was no
supplemental disclosure to shareholders on Merrill‟s deteriorating financial
condition before closing.61
On January 16, the Bank disclosed that losses from Merrill were over $15
billion for the fourth quarter ended December 31, 2008.62 This was over $3 billion
more than the $12 billion estimate Lewis had learned in mid-December, but the
information had not been disclosed to shareholders.63 The Bank also disclosed that
it would receive an additional $20 billion in TARP funds (an investment of
preferred stock with an 8 percent dividend), and would receive insurance
protection from market exposure of $118 billion in assets, primarily exposure from
Merrill‟s portfolio.64
B.

Reflections of the Principal Actors

Like the fire sale of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,
the acquisition of Merrill was a key event in the history of Wall Street and the
financial crisis.65 This deal also became controversial.66 Without the involvement of
Paulson and Bernanke, there was a possibility that the Bank would have invoked
the MAC and thereby compromised or complicated the deal. Controversy
surrounding the government‟s role in the merger ensued when Lewis was called to
testify before the New York Attorney General‟s office.67

59

Id.
Press Release, Bank of Am. Corp., Bank of America Completes Merrill Lynch Purchase (Jan. 1, 2009). Based
on the stock price, the deal closed at a value of $29.1 billion. Bank of Am. Corp., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q),
at 9 (May 7, 2009).
61
See infra note 86 and accompanying text.
62
Bank of Am. Corp., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Jan. 16, 2009).
63
See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
64
Bank of Am. Corp, Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Jan. 16, 2009).
65
The demise of these three firms marks the end of Wall Street‟s era of independent investment banks. During the
1990s, leading up to the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, independent investment banks had been acquired by
large commercial banks. See generally ALAN D. MORRISON & WILLIAM J. WILHELM, JR., INVESTMENT BANKING:
INSTITUTIONS, POLITICS, AND LAW (2007) (discussing the business of investment banking and historical industry
trends). Each of these firms was acquired by a commercial bank: Bear Stearns by JPMorgan Chase, investment
banking assets of Lehman Brothers by Barclays, and Merrill Lynch by Bank of America. Today, only Goldman
Sachs and Morgan Stanley remain independent, pure investment banks even though they converted to bank
holding companies in 2008. Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1-2 (Nov. 28, 2008);
Morgan Stanley & Co., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 1 (Nov. 30, 2008).
66
Louise Story & Jo Becker, Bank Chief Tells of U.S. Pressure to Buy Merrill Lynch, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2009,
at B1; Zachary Kouwe, Paulson Expected to Face Hard Questioning on Merrill Deal, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2009,
at B3; Edmund L. Andrews, Bernanke Defends His Role in Merrill Sale, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009, at B1.
67
The attorney general‟s office was investigating agreements on executive bonuses associated with the merger.
See infra note 110.
60
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Lewis testified that the federal government played a coercive role in the
merger. 68 The government disapproved of terminating the deal or delaying the
closing to renegotiate price.69 Paulson threatened that if the Bank backed out of the
deal with Merrill the government “could” or “would” fire the management and
board.70 Lewis believed that the government had the power to carry out its threat.71
Upon being threatened, he suggested that the Bank and government “deescalate
this for a while.”72 Absent the federal government‟s threat, Lewis wanted to invoke
the MAC, but felt he had no choice in the matter.73 He thought that “it was in the
best interest to go forward as had been instructed” because “if [the government]
had felt that strongly, then that should be a strong consideration for us to take into
account.” 74 As far as shareholders, their interest could not be isolated from
systemic risk considerations; the best interests of the country and shareholders
were intertwined.75 While going forward with the deal meant a short-term loss for
shareholders, Merrill still filled strategic necessities and over the long term would
still benefit shareholders.76
After this testimony, the New York Attorney General‟s office wrote to
Congress and informed it of questions “about the transparency of the TARP
program, as well as about corporate governance and disclosure practices at Bank of
America.”77 This prompted the congressional testimonies of Lewis, Bernanke, and
Paulson.78 While their testimonies differ in shades, they largely support Lewis‟s
account of events.
Lewis reaffirmed his prior testimony that Paulson‟s threat did not impress
him so much as the seriousness of a situation that could have led the government to
threaten a company and CEO in good standing.79 The exercise of the MAC would
have posed risks, including litigation risk and the risk of losing government
support during a financial crisis.80 According to Lewis, closing the deal was the
better option.81 He added that the “target was to [complete the merger] so that we
68

See Lewis Testimony before the New York Attorney General, supra note 47, at 52).
Bank of Am., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 90-91 (Jan. 16, 2009).
70
Id. at 52.
71
Id. at 54.
72
Id. at 52.
73
Id. at 58, 96.
74
Id. at 97, 151.
75
Bank of Am., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 82-83 (Jan. 16, 2009).
76
Id. at 86.
77
Letter from Andrew Cuomo, Att‟y Gen., State of N.Y., to Sen. Christopher Dodd, Chairman, Sen. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs; Rep. Barney Frank, Chairman, H. Fin. Servs. Comm.; Mary L. Schapiro,
Chair, Sec. Exch. Comm‟n; and Elizabeth Warren, Chair, Cong. Oversight Panel (Apr. 23, 2009).
78
Bank of America and Merrill Lynch: How Did A Private Deal Turn Into A Federal Bailout? Before the H.
Comm. on Oversight and Government Reform, 111th Cong. (June 11, 2009) (testimony of Kenneth Lee Lewis,
Chief Executive Officer, Bank of America), (Morning Session, June 11, 2009) [hereinafter “Lewis Testimony Part
I”]; (testimony of Lewis) (Afternoon Session, June 11, 2009), at 2 [“Lewis Testimony Part II”]; (testimony of Ben
S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve Board) (June 25, 2009) [hereinafter “Bernanke Testimony”]; (testimony of
Henry Paulson, former Secretary of the Treasury) (July 16, 2009) [hereinafter “Paulson Testimony”]; (prepared
testimony of Paulson (July 16, 2009), at 3 [hereinafter “Paulson Prepared Testimony”].
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Lewis Testimony before the New York Attorney General, supra note 78, at 8, 19.
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Id. at 30.
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Id. at 7, 9.
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didn‟t damage the economy anymore.”82 The Merrill acquisition was “in the best
interests of the financial system, the economy and the country” because the
collapse of Merrill, “on the heels of Lehman‟s failure, could have caused systemic
havoc or necessitated an AIG-style government bailout.”83 Shareholder interest was
inextricably intertwined with the financial system; harm to the financial system
would have inflicted harm to the company as well.84 Furthermore, the acquisition
had strategic value and promised long-term reward.85 Merrill‟s losses would push
the profitability of the deal toward a longer time horizon and affected short-term
shareholder value.86 As for disclosure, the government did not ask the board to
withhold any disclosure to shareholders. 87 Merrill‟s losses were not disclosed
before the deal closed because there was no agreement on its timing.88
For his part, Paulson confirmed that he threatened to fire the board and
management.89 He testified that the exercise of the MAC would have demonstrated
“a colossal lack of judgment and would jeopardize Bank of America, Merrill
Lynch, and the financial system.” 90 He and Bernanke believed that invoking a
MAC would have been detrimental to both the Bank and the financial system.91
Lawyers at the Federal Reserve believed that the Bank did not have sound legal
basis to exercise the MAC. 92 The market would have viewed the legal merit of
invoking the MAC as “quite low” and both Merrill and the Bank would have been
adversely affected by the possibility of detrimental litigation. 93 In justifying his
threat, Paulson added that “it‟s a pretty logical conclusion that maybe even the
regulator would be irresponsible . . . if they didn‟t hold [the Bank and Merrill]
accountable.”94 This statement implies that the board and management of the Bank
would have been replaced if they had proceeded with an ill-advised legal stratagem
to abort the merger.
Id. at 33. See also Paulson Testimony, supra note 86, at 18 (confirming Lewis‟s recollection).
Lewis Testimony Before the New York Attorney General, supra note 78, at 6-7. Lewis was criticized in the
media for putting the interest of the country over that of shareholders. See Sinclair Stewart, The Merrill Takeover:
Patriotic Bumbling? Bank of America‟s CEO Cites Loyalty to Country, After Huge Losses, Investors Wonder if
His Motive was Misguided, GLOBE & MAIL, Jan. 17, 2009, at B4.
84
Lewis Testimony Before the New York Attorney General, supra note 78, at 12.
85
Id. at 7, 31.
86
Id. at 23, 31.
87
Lewis Testimony Part II, supra note 86, at 2.
88
Lewis Testimony before the New York Attorney General, supra note 78, at 33-34.
89
Paulson Testimony, supra note 86, at 21-22; Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note 86, at 3. With respect to
Bernanke‟s role, he testified that, “I did not threaten him” and “I didn‟t tie it directly to replacing him or the board.”
Bernanke Testimony, supra note 86, at 47, 53. Nor did he instruct Paulson to communicate the threat. Id. at 14;
Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note 86, at 5. In his memoir, Paulson wrote of the incident: “I got back to Ken
later and again emphasized to him that the government would not let any systemically important institution fail;
that exercising the MAC would show a colossal lack of judgment by BofA; that such an action would jeopardize
his bank, Merrill Lynch, and the entire financial system; and that under such circumstances, the Fed, as BofA‟s
regulator, could take extreme measures, including the removal of management and the board.” HENRY PAULSON,
JR., ON THE BRINK: INSIDE THE RACE TO STOP THE COLLAPSE OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM 429-30 (2010).
90
Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note 86, at 4.
91
Bernanke Testimony, supra note 86, at 17, 31, 51; Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note 86, at 3.
92
Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note 86, at 3.
93
Id. at 11.
94
Paulson Testimony, supra note 86, at 37.
82
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Bernanke and Paulson distinguished their obligations as regulators from
the board‟s duty to shareholders. They testified that SEC disclosure obligations
were the company‟s responsibility.95 The government‟s disclosure obligation is to
the public, set forth in TARP, which the government satisfied.96 Bank supervisory
practice did not permit a regulator to impose an obligation on a financial institution
to financially injure itself for the public interest.97 Conversely, regulators did not
have a duty to protect the pecuniary interest of shareholders or bondholders vis-àvis the soundness of the financial institution and the markets or more broadly the
public welfare. In administering TARP, the Treasury Secretary must take into
consideration various factors including the protection of taxpayers, stability of the
financial markets, long-term viability of financial institutions, and efficient use of
funds.98
Bernanke and Paulson echoed Lewis‟s assessment of the public role the
Bank served in stabilizing the financial market: Merrill would have collapsed
without a takeover; a renegotiation of the purchase price would have created
uncertainty in the market; the failure of Merrill, which was bigger than Lehman
Brothers, would have destabilized the financial market even further.99
On the issue of whether the Bank‟s shareholders were forced “to take a
bullet,” Paulson testified:
[S]ome have opined that government officials involved in examining the Bank of America
Merrill Lynch merger—myself included—allowed concerns about systemic risk to our nation‟s
financial system to outweigh concerns about potential harm to Bank of America and its
shareholders. That simply did not happen. In my view, and the view of the numerous
government officials working on the matter, the interests of the nation and Bank of America
were aligned with respect to the closing of the Merrill Lynch transaction. An attempt by Bank
of America to break its contract to acquire Merrill Lynch would have threatened the stability of
our entire financial system and the viability of both Bank of America and Merrill Lynch.100

Bernanke added: “I think it was a very successful transaction. It helped stabilize
the financial markets. It put two companies back on a healthy path. It protected our
economy. And it was a good deal for taxpayers. . . . And it achieved public
objectives that were very important.” 101 Thus, both Paulson and Bernanke
forcefully defended their conduct and argued that government action produced
positive effects on the two companies and the financial markets.
C.

Merger Execution and Fiduciary Duty

As a preliminary manner, the Bank poorly executed the Merrill acquisition.
The disclosure and procedural issues stand out: were the board and the
95

Id. at 25.
Bernanke Testimony, supra note 86, at 3, 36-37.
97
Id. at 16.
98
Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 37.
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Bernanke Testimony, supra note 86, at 34, 50; Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note 86, at 3.
100
Paulson Prepared Testimony, supra note 86, at 3.
101
Bernanke Testimony, supra note 86, at 21.
96

11

shareholders properly informed by the management, advisers, and the merger
proxy, respectively, when each approved the acquisition? Only findings of facts or
admissions on the extent of knowable information and the scienter at the time can
resolve these issues. I comment no further on the disclosure and federal securities
issues.102 I assume that, as Lewis‟s testimony suggests, the Bank learned of the
accelerating pace of Merrill losses after the shareholder vote on December 5, 2008,
and that disclosure of material facts up to this point, including the merger proxy,
containing financial information dated October 30, was proper and thus the
shareholder vote was not tainted by faulty disclosure. Trial on these issues may
later prove these assumptions wrong, but the disclosure issue is tangential to the
thesis of this Article, which advances a theory of fiduciary exemption and a
broader comment on shareholder primacy.
The duty of care with respect to the merger execution on September 13-15
is also tangential. This issue is relevant here only insofar as the quality of the due
diligence may explain in part the board‟s later consideration to terminate the deal,
the event leading to the government‟s involvement in the Bank‟s corporate
governance. To develop this thought, I assess the duty of care issue.
A board‟s decision must be informed and made in good faith. This
requirement calls into question the board‟s initial approval of the merger. The
Delaware standard for the duty of care is gross negligence.103 With an informed
decision based on proper due diligence, the business judgment rule would protect
the board‟s decision to approve the merger.104 The decision of the Bank‟s board
constituted a high-risk strategic decision, and Delaware courts would not engage in
ex post analysis of an informed, good faith judgment made under uncertainty even
if the merger was poorly executed or the outcome was poor.105
102

As of the writing of this Article, issues pertaining to the disclosure issue are rapidly developing. On August 3,
2009, the Bank settled for $33 million with the SEC on charges concerning misleading and false disclosure to
shareholders with respect to executive bonuses paid out as a part of the Merrill acquisition. Zachery Kouwe, Bank
of America Settles S.E.C. Suit Over Merrill Deal, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2009, at B1. However, the federal district
court disapproved the settlement and ordered the case for trial. Sec. Exch. Comm‟n v. Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F.
Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). The opinion is notable for the tone of the court‟s indignation: “Overall, indeed, the
parties‟ submissions, when carefully read, leave the distinct impression that the proposed Consent Judgment was a
contrivance designed to provide the S.E.C. with the facade of enforcement and the management of the Bank with a
quick resolution of an embarrassing inquiry—all at the expense of the sole alleged victims, the shareholders.” Id.
at 510. Subsequently, the Bank and the SEC revised the proposed settlement to $150 million, but in a hearing the
federal court suggested that this amount may still be too small and proposed a range of $300 to $600 million.
Louise Story, Judge Questions Bank of America‟s New Deal with S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010. The
shareholder derivative lawsuit in the Delaware Chancery Court alleges a breach of fiduciary duty based on a
failure to inform shareholders of Merrill‟s losses. Derivative Complaint, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 11-16. Moreover, on
February 4, 2010, the New York Attorney General filed civil fraud charges against the Bank, Lewis and Joseph
Price (the Bank‟s chief financial officer at the time). Louise Story, Cuomo Sues Bank of America, Even as It
Settles with S.E.C., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2010. See Cuomo v. Bank of Am. Corp. et al., Complaint (Sup. Ct. N.Y.,
Feb. 4, 2010).
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Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985).
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See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (noting that the business judgment rule protects
“directors of a corporation [who] acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the action
taken was in the best interests of the company.”).
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See In re Caremark Int‟l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch. 1996) (reasoning that upon the
proper application of the business judgment rule there is no ex post review of actions that were “substantively
wrong, or degrees of wrong extending through „stupid‟ to „egregious‟ or „irrational‟ . . .”).
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However, the board‟s decision was not an informed one because the
procedure used to approve the Merrill acquisition was highly flawed. The facts in
the seminal decision, Smith v. Van Gorkom,106 are informative. There, the target
company was undergoing a sale process.107 The board was found to have violated
the duty of care based on several factors: a failure to adequately inform itself of
vital aspects of the deal, including the intrinsic value of the company; approving
the sale after only two hours of consideration; and failure to read the deal
documents because they were unavailable at the board meeting.108 The Delaware
Supreme Court held that these facts were sufficient to prove the board‟s gross
negligence.109
The publicly available facts suggest that the Bank‟s board was grossly
negligent in the process used to approve the Merrill acquisition. Indeed, the
board‟s negligence is qualitatively worse than the simple negligence in Van
Gorkom.110 The obvious problem is the quality of the due diligence. The merger
agreement states that due diligence on the deal was conducted over a period of a
day and a half (Saturday afternoon to Sunday evening), about thirty hours.111 Such
a short time period could not have been sufficient to conduct adequate due
diligence on a business as big and complex as Merrill Lynch in normal times, let
alone in a time of extreme market volatility and crisis. Is it plausible that the Bank
adequately reviewed within a matter of a few hours asset quality, liabilities, trading
positions, risk management structures, values at risk, along with many other facets
of the business? The answer is certainly not. The two companies probably engaged
armies of internal and external lawyers, accountants, and bankers, and there was
probably frantic activity during the weekend, creating an illusion of due diligence.
But raw manpower can only do so much in a short time period; reasonable due
diligence entails contemplation and assimilation of information learned.112
The choice of financial advisers, no small decision, is also informative.
Merrill used its own investment bankers who delivered the fairness opinion.113 The
Bank hired two financial advisers who delivered fairness opinions: J.C. Flowers &
106

488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); see also Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 713 n.54 (Del. 2009) (holding that
shareholder ratification subjects “the challenged director action to business judgment review, as opposed to
„extinguishing‟ the claim altogether . . . .”).
107
Van Gorkom. 488 A.2d at 873.
108
Id. at 874.
109
Id. at 884.
110
See William T. Allen et al.,, Function Over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware
Corporation Law, 56 BUS. LAW. 1287, 1300 (2001) (arguing that the facts in Van Gorkom may have shown
negligence but not gross negligence); Sean Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 14 (2005) (“The majority of commentators now agree that on the
merits the evidence does not support the conclusion that the Trans Union board had been grossly negligent.”).
111
This time is calculated from the time Lewis and Thain discussed a merger (Saturday, 2:30 p.m.) to the time of
the announcement of the deal (Sunday, 9:23 p.m.), less one hour for lag time in organizing due diligence and other
down time. Derivative Complaint, supra note 7, at ¶¶ 64, 71.
112
I draw from my own experience of conducting due diligence as an investment banker on complex, multi-billion
dollar potential acquisition of an investment bank in 2000. My recollection was that approximately 70 people were
involved to varying degrees in the due diligence, which took several weeks to complete.
113
MERGER PROXY, supra note 15, at Appendix E. Query how objective this fairness opinion could have been
given the management‟s and board‟s support of the deal.
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Co., a private equity firm, and Fox-Pitt Kelton Cochran Caronia Waller (“FPK”), a
boutique investment bank specializing in financial institutions.114 A deal like the
merger of the Bank and Merrill would be a landmark transaction on Wall Street
with huge investment banking fees (J.C. Flowers and FPK received a total of $20
million in fees).115 The advisory work on these kinds of deals are usually handled
by top-tier investment banking firms, such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,
UBS Warburg, Credit Suisse First Boston, JPMorgan Chase, or other comparable
firms. Why use one‟s own investment bankers as Merrill did, and a private equity
firm and a boutique investment bank as the Bank did for such a large complex deal?
One can speculate on several plausible explanations. J.C. Flowers had
experience in restructuring of financial institutions. It was involved in attempting
to rescue Bear Stearns only a few months before.116 Because it is a private equity
firm, it did not compete with Merrill or the Bank on capital markets and trading
activities. 117 Both firms may have been concerned about competitors gaining
intelligence on their assets and liabilities and trading book, which may have had
enormous informational value during unprecedented market turmoil. This is not to
impugn the honesty or professionalism of investment bankers, but only to suggest
that the risk of harmful leaks, rumors, and misinformation may have been
substantial and potentially fatal in volatile markets. Even so, the companies could
have used other investment bankers who were not competitors in capital market
activities, such as Lazard, a premier boutique mergers and acquisition advisor with
deep expertise in financial institutions.118 Another plausible explanation for why
the boards of the Bank and Merrill used these advisers is that perhaps the major
investment banks did not want to run the risk of advising on this deal under these
situational constraints. There may have been substantial liability as well as
reputational risks associated with the merger. At the time, most large investment
and money center banks were embroiled in their own fights for survival. 119 The
prestige and the fees may not have been worth exposing themselves to the legal
risks of issuing a fairness opinion under these constraints, necessitating the
appointment of other financial advisers who were more willing to undertake the
risks for the fees and the opportunity to work on a landmark deal.
Another point about due diligence is worth mentioning. It is standard
protocol that when rendering fairness opinions for a deal, investment bankers do
114

Id. at Appendices C & D. I note that I was a vice president of investment banking at FPK, where I worked from
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See id. Private equity firms make principal investments in firms or assets, which are held in a portfolio for
longer durations. They typically do not engage in trading of securities in a broker-dealer capacity as full service
investment banks do.
118
Lazard advised Bear Stearns during its crisis and eventual merger with JPMorgan Chase. Id. at 73, 88-89.
119
See generally ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL STREET AND
WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES (2009) (describing how Morgan
Stanley and Goldman Sachs were in peril during the financial crisis).

14

not independently assess the company‟s assets and liabilities.120 Both the FPK and
J.C. Flowers fairness opinion letters have such a disclaimer. 121 The specific
disclaimer of non-verification of the company‟s assets and liabilities is a standard
term in fairness opinions.122 If the financial advisers were not analyzing the quality
of the assets and liabilities, who were? While the fairness opinions spoke to the
value of the firm based on market metrics, including transaction and comparable
companies multiples and discounted cash flow (“DCF”) analysis,123 such top-down
valuational analyses are largely worthless under the extenuating circumstances.
The value drivers of the Bank-Merrill merger were not market metrics or
theoretical outputs from a DCF model. They were instead the fair values of assets
and liabilities, which could only have been determined by a bottom-up,
independent assessment of the firm‟s internal books. The crisis posed unique
valuational issues. For instance, in a failing market system the “fair value” may not
necessarily have been the “fair market value” per mark-to-market pricing.124 There
could have been a significant divergence between the “hold” and the “sale” values
of exotic and illiquid security with enormous uncertainty as to the former, thus
discounting the latter value. Valuation would have required a bottom-up cash flow
analysis of the individual assets and liabilities, and calculations of both the “hold”
and the “sale” values. When markets are highly unstable or severely
malfunctioning, the indices of price reflected in standard market and theoretical
valuation techniques cannot possibly form the basis for a fairness opinion, and at

Cf. Klang v. Smith‟s Food & Drug Ctr., Inc., 702 A.2d 150, 155-56 (Del. 1997) (holding that an investment
banker need not calculate assets and liabilities separately in providing a solvency report to the board).
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The FPK fairness opinion letter provides the typical disclaimer on this specific point.
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In rendering our opinion, we have assumed and relied, without independent verification, upon the
accuracy and completeness of all the information examined by, or otherwise reviewed or discussed
with, us for the purposes of this opinion. We have not made or obtained an independent valuation or
appraisal of the assets, liabilities (contingent, derivative, off-balance sheet or otherwise) or solvency of
the Company or Merrill Lynch, including particularly any mark-to-market balance sheet adjustments
resulting from the Merger, market conditions or otherwise. We relied solely upon information provided
to us by the Company and other publicly available information with respect to Merrill Lynch‟s
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least the use of the typical fairness opinion should not provide legal cover for a
lack of common sense.125
Only a deal team with proper skills and sufficient time could have
performed a bottom-up analysis of the internal books, which is the only way
reasonable due diligence could have been done when there is a significant
possibility that the target is a distressed financial institution. A few months before,
JPMorgan Chase found itself in a similar situation with the rushed, crisisprecipitated acquisition of Bear Stearns. During due diligence occurring over a
single weekend, resembling the circumstance of the Merrill acquisition, it appeared
that JPMorgan Chase would not proceed with the deal.126 A Bear Stearns board
member commented on this apparent development: “If I were Jamie Dimon
[JPMorgan Chase‟s CEO], I would have had some concerns myself because you
never do a deal as big as that on one day‟s due diligence. What‟s the upside versus
the downside?” 127 Notably, JPMorgan Chase continued with the Bear Stearns
acquisition only with government financial support and risk sharing arrangements.
To suggest that the Bank fully assessed Merrill within a matter of a few hours
during extraordinary circumstances is a bridge too far.128 The deviation from what
is reasonable under the circumstances here is so great that executing the merger
agreement while essentially blind to the underlying values of the assets and
liabilities of a business as complex as Merrill meets the demanding standard of
gross negligence and perhaps even reckless dereliction of duty. 129 This is a far
greater transgression than Jason Van Gorkom‟s execution of the merger agreement
at the Chicago Lyric Opera, which was largely a problem of optics.130
Although the Bank‟s board was grossly negligent in executing the
acquisition, it would not be liable in fact. The decision in Smith v. Van Gorkom
125

In analyzing the fairness opinion given in the Bear Stearns deal, William Cohan, a former investment banker,
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resulted in the enactment of DGCL section 102(b)(7).131 This statute allows for a
provision in the certificate of incorporation eliminating or limiting the personal
liability of a director for monetary damages for breach of the duty of care.132 The
Bank, a Delaware corporation, has such an exculpatory provision.133
With the deal execution in context, we can synthesize the operative facts
concerning the Bank board‟s actions in mid-December 2008—after, as this Article
assumes, the board, the Federal Reserve, and shareholders approved the deal.
The Merrill acquisition had a profound link to the financial markets. The
government coerced the Bank‟s board and management to close the merger. This
threat was credible because federal banking agencies have the power to remove a
corporation‟s board and management upon a showing that they engaged in unsafe
or unsound practice resulting in financial loss or probable loss.134 The government
was motivated by the need to stem further harm to the financial market, the most
immediate problem being a collapse of Merrill on the heels of Bear Stearns and
Lehman Brothers.
Lewis‟s and the board‟s motivations are more ambiguous. Viewed
narrowly in terms of deal economics, closing the acquisition was financially bad
for shareholders since the company assumed far greater, multi-billion dollar losses
than it had expected.135 Like many classic corporate law cases, the motivations of
the board and Lewis, acting in his capacity both as CEO and chairman of the board,
do not sort into tidy categories or neat characterizations. The episode is colored in
shades of gray, and one must engage in some degree of plausible speculation.
The board minutes plainly state that the government‟s threat did not
influence the board members,136 though such self-serving notice, by itself, cannot
be taken seriously. The cynic is sometimes wise. The board was aware of the
potential for shareholder derivative or federal securities litigation. The board
minutes state that Lewis recommended not invoking a MAC because the
131
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government told him not to do so, and he changed his mind only in response to
Paulson‟s threat.137 Internal e-mails at the Federal Reserve show that Lewis was
concerned about lawsuits and sought to use the government‟s position as a legal
defense. Scott Alvarez, the general counsel of the Federal Reserve, wrote in an email:
[Lewis] said he now fears lawsuits from shareholders for NOT invoking the MAC, given the
deterioration at [Merrill]. I don‟t think that‟s very likely and said so. However, he still asked
whether he could use as a defense that the govt ordered him to proceed for systemic reasons. I
said no. It is true, however, that we have done analyses that indicate that not going through
with the merger would pose important risks at [the Bank] itself. So here‟s my question: Can the
supervisors formally advise him that a MAC is not in the best interest of his company? If we
did, could he cite that in defense if he did get sued for not pursuing a MAC?138

In a subsequent e-mail, Alvarez wrote to Bernanke:
All that said, I don‟t think it‟s necessary or appropriate for us to give Lewis a letter along the
lines he asked. First, we didn‟t order him to go forward—we simply explained our views on
what the market reaction would be and left the decision to him. Second, making hard decisions
is what he gets paid for and only he has the full information needed to make the decision—so
we shouldn‟t take him off the hook by appearing to take the decision out of his hands.139

These e-mails show that the consideration of legal risk was a significant factor in
explaining the behavior of Lewis and the board. They also raise the possibility that
the purported purpose of providing government aid can possibly be used as a
defense to a charge of breach of fiduciary duty.
In light of Lewis‟s concern about litigation, it is possible that he
considered terminating the deal, whether contractually sound or not, because
Merrill‟s losses were exposing the failure of due diligence. This bad outcome
called into serious question the competence of the management and the board.140
Recall that the Bank had the superior bargaining leverage on September 13 when
Lewis and Thain negotiated the deal, but nevertheless paid a 70 percent premium
for Merrill, which would then go on to lose over $15 billion in the fourth quarter of
2008.
A flawed due diligence also may be the basis for another explanation.
Faced with a badly executed and overpriced deal of his own fault, Lewis may have
shrewdly tried to salvage a bad situation by threatening to invoke a MAC, legal
basis notwithstanding. He coerced a frightened government to make financial
commitments, which the Bank in fact got as a part of closing the Merrill deal.141 In
137
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the end, the government also made sure that Lewis and the board paid a personal
price for this deception.142 This explanation suggests that invoking a MAC was not
a serious possibility after all, but merely a stalking horse. There are no heroes in
this tale, only people making imperfect decisions and exercising bad judgment in
extraordinary times and market conditions.
The theory of covering up a badly executed deal finds additional support in
internal machinations involving the Bank‟s senior managers. Timothy Mayopoulos,
the Bank‟s former general counsel, testified to the events leading to his
termination. 143 The timeline is telling. On November 12, 2008, he was given a
written projection showing that Merrill would lose approximately $5 billion in the
fourth quarter.144 On November 20, the senior management, including Mayopoulos,
concluded that the $5 billion projected loss need not be disclosed to
shareholders.145 On December 1, senior executives, including the chief financial
officer (“CFO”), asked him to review the MAC clause in the merger agreement,
and he advised that there was no MAC because, among other reasons, Merrill‟s
performance was not disproportionately worse than other firms, including the
Bank‟s. 146 On December 3, Mayopoulos learned that Merrill‟s losses were
estimated to be $7 billion.147 On December 9, he attended a board meeting and
there learned that this estimate had increased to $9 billion.148 On December 10, he
was fired per Lewis‟s order.149 Subsequently, Brian Moynihan assumed the role of

believe Lewis was genuinely concerned about the deterioration of Merrill‟s financial situation. Bernanke
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general counsel, and he opined that the Bank has a valid case to invoke a MAC.150
Presumably, with this new advice, Lewis was able to represent to Paulson during
their December 17 conversation that he was considering invoking a MAC, whereas
he could not credibly do so if his general counsel had advised him there was no
MAC.151
Lewis‟s use of the MAC as leverage to coerce financial aid is the dark
view of the board‟s motive. However, Lewis is only one board member, albeit the
most important, and there are a number of other plausible explanations for the
board‟s decision to close the deal. The board could have been intimidated and
unduly influenced by the government. It could have decided to go through with the
deal, as the minutes suggest, based on the best interest of the corporation and its
shareholders. It could have exercised independent judgment and reasonably
deferred to the expert advice of regulators based on broader considerations of
systemic risk and public welfare, which were intimately related to the best interest
of the company in the longterm though current shareholders suffered in the short
term. Lastly, in a complex situation and under stress, perhaps the most likely
explanation is that the board acted with mixed motive, taking all of these factors
into consideration with each board member assigning different weights to them to
come to a collective decision: their entrenchment interest, their desire to remedy a
poorly executed deal, the pecuniary interest of shareholders, the long-term interest
of the corporation, the financial markets, systemic risk, good faith belief in the
expertise of regulators, and the public welfare.152
D.

Merger Closing and Fiduciary Duty

If the merger execution was flawed, was the decision to close a flawed
merger also problematic? In the December 22 board meeting, the Bank‟s board
made three important decisions: (1) not to exercise the MAC; (2) not to renegotiate
the purchase price; and (3) not to inform shareholders of accelerating losses at
Merrill before closing of the deal.153 Upon an informed decision, the board would
150
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be entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule absent disloyalty or bad
faith.154 There would be a loyalty problem if, for example, the board decided not to
renegotiate or terminate the deal based on a conflict of interest, such as the desire
to avoid scrutiny of its initial flawed decision to approve the merger, or to entrench
its interest by acquiescing to the government‟s demand to close the deal in
response to a threat of removal. Let us proceed on the factual assumption that the
board‟s decision was informed, but that the board was conflicted or not
independent. The loyalty issue would still have a serious causation problem: that is,
whether the board even had the legal option to invoke a MAC at this time.
Found in most merger agreements, a MAC allocates the risk of an adverse
event between signing and closing, and is one of the most important clauses in a
merger agreement.155 The provision in the Bank-Merrill merger agreement defines
a “material adverse effect” as “a material adverse effect on (i) the financial
condition, results of operations or business of such party and its Subsidiaries taken
as a whole . . . or (ii) the ability of such party to timely consummate the
transactions contemplated by this Agreement.”156 This definition has a significant
carve-out:
“Material Adverse Effect” shall not be deemed to include effects to the extent resulting
from . . . changes in . . . general business, economic or market conditions, including changes
generally in prevailing interest rates, currency exchange rates, credit markets and price levels
or trading volumes in the United States or foreign securities markets, in each case generally
affecting the industries in which such party or its Subsidiaries operate and including changes to
any previously correctly applied asset marks resulting there from . . . except . . . to the extent
that the effects of such change are disproportionately adverse to the financial condition, results
of operations or business of such party and its Subsidiaries, taken as a whole, as compared to
other companies in the industry in which such party and its Subsidiaries operate . . . .157

This definition excludes changes in “general business, economic or market
conditions, including changes generally in . . . credit markets and price levels or
trading volumes in . . . securities market[s],”158 but imports back into the definition
of material adverse effect changes that are “disproportionately adverse . . . as
compared to other companies in the industry.”159
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This carve-out most probably would cover the deterioration of asset
quality on Merrill‟s portfolio. It is clear that the worsening condition of the capital
markets directly caused Merrill‟s losses. This situation is specifically carved-out of
the definition of material adverse effect. The Bank could have argued that Merrill
had previously marked its assets incorrectly. However, this is a matter of past due
diligence, and the MAC is a forward-looking provision addressing a change in
condition after the signing. It would have been difficult to argue that Merrill‟s
changes were disproportionately adverse as compared to other companies. Merrill
was one of only five independent investment banks remaining after the industry
consolidation of the 1990s, the others being Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley,
Lehman Brothers, and Bear Stearns.160 By the time Merrill was accruing the losses
in question, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brother, two true peers of Merrill, had
already succumbed to the crisis, and Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley were
struggling to survive. 161 Most other major financial institutions with investment
banking or trading activities, such as Citigroup, AIG, and UBS, were also highly
distressed. 162 Importantly, as well, the Bank was also distressed, and Merrill‟s
situation was arguably no more adverse than the Bank‟s.163 By this time as well, the
government forced the leading financial institutions, including Merrill and the
Bank, to accept TARP funding.164 Extreme distress in financial condition was the
norm in the investment banking and financial institutions sector, which is not
surprising given that their distress triggered the worldwide economic crisis.165
The MAC was written into the merger agreement on September 14-15,
2008, at a time when the financial markets were becoming highly unstable.166 The
merger consideration was a stock exchange, which meant that the market values of
160
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both Merrill and the Bank were subject to fluctuations in the value of their assets.
The parties clearly understood that market volatility would likely affect the deal
price, but each party equally assumed this risk. Although Merrill suffered heavy
losses, they were not a MAC as defined in the merger agreement. No Delaware
case has upheld the exercise of a MAC, and this is the result of a deliberate policy
choice.167 The application of Delaware case law on material adverse change clauses
suggests that the Bank‟s legal position was untenable.168
Without a material adverse event, the board could not have terminated the
merger, or credibly renegotiated the price. In ordinary times, perhaps the Bank
could have attempted to invoke the MAC to renegotiate the merger consideration
even with a low probability legal hand.169 Frivolous cases are sometimes settled for
positive value, especially when the holder of the legal right is vulnerable.170 But an
attempt to do so in these circumstances would have injected significant systemic
risk into the financial system as Paulson testified: “[I]t would be unthinkable for
Bank of America to take this destructive action for which there was no reasonable
legal basis and which would show a lack of judgment.”171
Given the absence of a viable legal option, neither the shareholders nor the
board could have taken any action to avoid the losses and thus the board had no
fiduciary duty under state law to disclose the Merrill losses, however material,
outside of whatever SEC obligations there were.172 At the time, market volatility
affected the values of assets and liabilities on a day-to-day, mark-to-market
basis.173 The internal estimations of Merrill‟s losses were changing day-to-day in
swings of billions of dollars.174 These wild swings in estimates caused the buyer‟s
remorse. In this situation, the efficacy of disclosure wholly breaks down because
one day‟s accurate disclosure could very well have been the next day‟s inaccurate
information. What if the board disclosed a $12 billion estimated loss on a Monday,
and on Friday this estimation increased to $15 billion? The board must have
realized the potentially grave harm the corporation risked sustaining if it
voluntarily disclosed certain financial information about Merrill‟s mounting
losses. 175 Voluntary disclosure of bad news in an unstable market may have
resulted in greater harm to both corporations and to a financial market already in
peril. These were unprecedented times in the capital markets.
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When Paulson threatened to fire the Bank‟s management and board, the
threat created a potential loyalty problem. It is plausible that the board did not act
independently and its members were conflicted. Under Delaware law, a director is
independent if she decides on the merits of the transaction rather than on
extraneous considerations. 176 Independence is inconsistent with dominion or
control by an individual or entity interested in the transactions.177 A director has a
conflict of interest if she will be materially affected by a board‟s decision, in a
manner not shared by the corporation and the shareholders.178 Self-interest includes
a desire for entrenchment.179 It is not enough that a contrary decision could result in
a loss of position; other facts indicting a disloyal motive must be shown. 180 A
credible, articulated, direct threat of termination would probably suffice to show a
potential loyalty problem.181
The facts established through testimony are: Lewis wanted to exercise the
MAC;182 Paulson threatened that to do so would result in the termination of the
board and management; upon management‟s recommendation, which was based
on “instructions” from the government, the board did not invoke the MAC. These
facts plausibly suggest three scenarios: (1) Lewis and the board hoodwinked the
government with the threat of invoking a low probability legal strategy with a high
probability of large collateral harm if the threat was carried out in an effort to coax
public financial aid; (2) upon reconsideration after receipt of the government‟s
strongly termed advice, the board was persuaded by the government‟s rationale
and they exercised independent judgment not to invoke a MAC consistent with the
government‟s reasoning to proceed with closing the merger; or (3) the board
lacked independence and simply acquiesced to the government‟s demand.
Negotiations ethics aside, the first decision advanced the Bank‟s financial
health. The second decision would be an independent, informed business judgment,
which may or may not have resulted in net financial harm to the company. These
decisions would be entitled to the protection of the business judgment rule. The
third decision would be tainted for lack of independence. The board would have
rubber stamped a government order. However, the resulting decision would not be
automatically void. Section 144(a)(3) of the DGCL shields a transaction or
contract from voidability if it “is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is
176
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authorized, approved or ratified, by the board of directors, a committee or the
shareholders.”183 Where there is a loyalty problem, the presumption of the business
judgment rule does not apply and the transaction is actively scrutinized for
fairness.184
The fairness inquiry would fail for lack of an injury. 185 The board‟s
decision to close the deal was proper for the simple reason that there was no choice.
Intentional or not, Lewis and the board incorrectly asserted the legality of invoking
the MAC. Terminating or renegotiating the deal would have led to the losing side
of a lawsuit. Such action would have damaged the financial market with adverse
consequences on both firms.186 The board would have run the risk of alienating the
government and diminishing the company‟s ability to access financial aid, at least
with the current board and management still in place. Whether or not the board
was unduly influenced, its decision turned out to be fair and advanced the best
interest of the company. This could be the unusual case in which the board took the
correct action because it was disloyal. A plausible motive for attempting to invoke
a weak case for a MAC was a desire to remedy a poorly executed and negotiated
merger by renegotiating the merger consideration. This ill-advised legal strategy to
fix a prior wrong could have produced an even worse outcome for the company.
The government, acting in the best interest of the public welfare, forced the correct
board action, an outcome possible only when the interests of the public and the
corporation are aligned and a risky possibility of increasing the shareholder‟s
pecuniary stake potentially conflicts with these interests.
What do we conclude from this case study? Legally, liability under
Delaware corporate law is unlike because of exculpation for any duty of care
violations, and because there simply was no injury to shareholders under an
assumption that their vote for the merger was not tainted by faulty disclosure.
More broadly, the case study reveals that there is a real possibility, though unlikely
given the available facts, that shareholders “took a bullet” in terms of assuming
large short-term losses to avoid the injection of more systemic risk into a crippled
financial system, and that the company‟s management and board, prompted by
government entreaties, were motivated in part at least to advance the public‟s
interest in stabilizing a financial crisis over the shareholder‟s immediate pecuniary
interest. This recital of the facts, currently known as of the writing of this Article,
is important to show the contextual color of the regulatory and corporate decision
making. This case study reveals an important aspect of corporate governance that
thus far has not had an opportunity to be analyzed: that is, corporate governance is
not always a purely private affair, but instead can be a public-private coordinated
decision in times of national crisis or systemic risk.
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QUESTIONS

1.

What is the role of a private firm during a public crisis?

2.

What are the responsibilities of a board during a public crisis?

3.

What is the role of government in these situations?

4.

Suppose that Bank of America had the legal option to terminate the merger
with Merrill Lynch. What should the Bank of America board have done?
What are the criteria by which the board makes its decisions?
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